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Abstract
CHRISTOPHER A. THOMPSON: Political and Institutional Constraints on Policy Responses 
to the Financial Crisis in the United States and the European Union
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe)
 This essay will attempt to explain what caused the variation in policy outputs in response 
to the financial and economic crisis in the United States and the European Union which began in 
2007.  Specifically, it will examine the design of fiscal and monetary stimulus in both regions, as 
well as the development of financial supervisory and regulatory legislation.  Ultimately it will be 
shown that the variation in policy outputs was the result of differing constitutional mandates, 
relation to public opinion, and dominant policy paradigms at the respective central banks; 
evolving contemporary political trends; and differing concentrations of legislative power, 
understood from the perspectives of federalism and multi-level governance.
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I. Introduction
 Since Fall 2007, the world economy has been upset by the economic crisis which 
began in that year.  The consequences of what began as a private sector crisis have been 
mitigated by public action, although there has been little consensus on the best way forward 
within the countries most affected, much less internationally.  Indeed, in the United States 
and in Europe, similar policy actions have been undertaken, but there have also been 
dramatically different approaches to re-stabilizing their respective economies and reigniting 
growth, and they have come at different times and with varying degrees of political difficulty. 
This paper will seek to analyze the governmental response to the economic crisis in the 
United States and European Union from a political and institutional perspective by focusing 
on economic stimulus and the introduction of legislation to regulate the financial industry.  
Although the resulting policies and their effects are important and will be mentioned, the 
investigative focus of this essay will be more concerned with how and why such policies 
came to fruition.  In particular, the following questions will be addressed.  First, why was the 
US able to enact comprehensive and detailed financial regulatory reform, while the EU 
approached the issue by establishing a variety of new regulatory agencies?  Second, why was 
US fiscal stimulus so large and centrally-administered while fiscal stimulus in the EU was 
relatively small and established unevenly by the member states?  Third, why is the Federal 
Reserve still engaging in expansionary monetary policy nearly six years after the beginning 
of the crisis while the European Central Bank has engaged in relatively tight monetary 
policy?  In this paper I argue that the speed and content of economic policy response can be 
understood as a function of: 1. Central bank mandates and perceptions of central bank 
legitimacy, 2. Contemporary political trends and parties in power, 3. The extent to which 
legislative power was concentrated (in the US) or dispersed (in the EU), drawing on studies 
of federalism and multi-level governance.  I will explore each of these elements in 
subsequent sections, but before proceeding through the analytical meat of the essay, I will 
 
spend some time providing a relatively straightforward account of the economic crisis and 
manner of response in the United States and European Union by their respective central 
banks and state and federal governments. 
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II. Policy Timeline
 A brief review of the unfolding crisis may be useful before a full discussion of the  
policies in question.  Strong economic growth starting in the mid 1990s contributed to 
overoptimism regarding permanent growth levels, which was accompanied by low interest 
rates in the US, low inflation, and a glut of liquidity and credit.  Although commodity prices 
remained stable, asset prices increased dramatically.  The ensuing real estate bubble in the 
US was matched by an increase in the use of highly complex financial derivatives and 
securitization financing techniques as investors armed with high levels of liquidity sought 
greater yields than those offered by modest government bonds.  Major consequences of this 
activity were dangerously leveraged financial institutions and irresponsible lending and 
borrowing (European Commission 2009, 7-8).
 The growing potential crisis was exacerbated by inadequate risk management, both 
by firms in the financial sector as well as the regulatory agencies responsible for their 
supervision, and increasing opacity of complex financial instruments; underestimation of 
default risk by credit ratings agencies and the perverse conflicts of interest between the CRAs 
and the financial sector; and failures in corporate governance driven by irresponsible 
executive compensation schemes and outright misunderstanding of their own products 
(European Commission 2009, 8-11). 
 In the fall of 2007, credit markets were disrupted as a rash of failing subprime 
mortgages triggered a succession of dropping asset values, spiking capital requirements at 
banks, and a domino effect throughout the financial system, culminating most dramatically 
with the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  As investors around the world had 
been channeling money into the failing mortgage-backed securities, the crisis reverberated 
far beyond the US.  This banking crisis and evaporation of liquidity spurred the Fed and ECB 
into action to maintain liquidity in the interbank market.  It was not long before the effects of 
the crisis in the financial sector were felt in the economy more broadly, causing a severe drop 
 
in employment and economic output in the United States and European Union.  This 
economic downturn, along with the use of sovereign funds to bail out national banks, led 
investors to fear the possibility of a sovereign debt crisis in the EU, the reverberations of 
which are still being felt.  Drudi has separated the various phases of crisis as follows: “the 
financial turmoil (9 August 2007–14 September 2008), the global financial crisis (15 
September 2008–7 May 2010) and the eurozone sovereign debt crisis (8 May 2010–the 
present)” (2012, 881). 
 Considering the general lack of coordination, divergent policy prescriptions, and 
disparate growth rates of today, it is odd to think of the collaborative efforts that came in the 
immediate aftermath of the financial crisis.  Regardless, there was indeed substantial 
transatlantic policy coordination and political congruency in 2008 and 2009.  This should be 
expected to some degree, as in these early months the crisis was primarily financial in nature 
(before evolving into a broader economic crisis, and even later into a sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe).  Accordingly, the necessary steps were fairly clear in the early days to solve the 
rapidly developing problems of the financial industry.  Later it would become apparent that 
financial regulation would be necessary, but at first it was primarily a matter of logistics. 
We will see that in the immediate wake of the crisis, the European Union and 
United States acted quickly and similarly to stabilize their respective private sectors by 
providing liquidity and state support to the financial industry, as well as through targeted 
spending to sustain and revive their economies.  Initially, both cut interest rates through their 
central banks, extended deposit guarantees, provided liquidity to the financial industry, and 
initiated fiscal stimulus (Pisani-Ferry 2012, 9).  However, it was in the months and years that 
followed that their paths diverged.  International discord and lack of consensus on the way 
forward resulted in a policy push for austerity in suffering EU countries, while federally 
directed stimulus was used on a much larger scale to support and revive the flagging 
economy in the US.  Additionally, the Federal Reserve in the United States has engaged in 
stimulative monetary policy in the years since the crisis by not only keeping interest rates 
low but also continuing to inject cash into the economy.  The ECB, on the other hand, has 
supported national banks but mostly stayed true to its mandate by keeping inflation in check 
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(regardless of what effects this does or does not have), and fiscal support has been rather 
limited.  Both the US and EU also passed legislation reforming their respective financial 
sectors at a certain point, but took substantially different approaches to the issue.
 Today, more than five years beyond the beginning of the crisis, the recovery in the US 
has been tepid but steady, while some parts of the EU have experienced a double-dip 
recession and the crisis seems far from resolved.  (Indeed, the Cyprus bailout drama is 
playing out at the time of this writing.)  Later I will elaborate on my hypothesis for why a 
similar crisis developed down such divergent paths. 
 
A. Stimulus
 Fiscal Stimulus
 European Union. Targeted fiscal stimulus was undertaken in the EU, but in contrast 
to the United States, execution was only nominally guided by the European Commission.  
Rather the responsibility for funding and carrying out the stimulus was primarily the domain 
of member states.  The Commission released a stimulus plan proposal on November 26, 
2008, suggesting a package of measures to be undertaken primarily at the level of the 
member states (European Commission 2008, 6).  One reason for stimulus spending at the 
member state level is that the budget of the EU, while substantial, does not have a 
comparable macroeconomic impact as the US federal budget or of the budgets of the EU 
member states.  Specifically, the budget of the EU is equivalent to 1.05% of GDP for the 
period of 2007-2013 (European Union 2006).  This is in contrast to the US budget, which for 
FY2013 is estimated to be equivalent to 19.4% of GDP (Office of Management and Budget 
2013, 25).
 The European Economic Recovery Plan, as envisioned by the Commission, was 
comprised of two pillars, supported by one underlying principle.  The first pillar of the plan 
was a direct spending injection of €200 billion (1.5% of GDP) which would boost demand 
and confidence within the guidelines of the Stability and Growth Pact (European 
Commission 2008, 2).  If the first pillar is seen as focused on near-term objectives, the 
second pillar is more concerned with the long-term outlook.  The second pillar was 
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comprised of a series of steps to ensure Europe’s future competitiveness through measures 
such as investments in clean and efficient energy technologies, investments in workforce 
skills development, and investments in infrastructure.  This also included steps toward 
lowering administrative burdens, and providing capital for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs).  Underlying these pillars was the fundamental principle of facilitating solidarity and 
ensuring social justice.  This cited the duty to help the most needy and to focus on social 
change in times of crisis, and to utilize the European Globalization Adjustment Fund and 
European Social Fund (European Commission 2008, 11). 
 A credit squeeze, falling house prices, and troubled stock markets all caused loss of 
consumer confidence, consumption, and investment.  The European stimulus was introduced 
when growth was predicted to be 0% for 2009, with some member states having already 
slipped into recession (European Commission 2008, 4).  The introduction to the plan made 
explicitly clear that the risk was for a self-perpetuating economic spiral in which a negative 
feedback loop is created among “falling demand, downsized business plans, reduced 
innovation, and job cuts” (European Commission 2008, 4).  The plan encouraged member 
states to rely on the strengths of the EU of coordination and stability frameworks as designed 
by the SGP and Lisbon strategy, along with the scale of the euro and single market as they 
formulated measures to emerge from the economic crisis.  The plan cites the legitimacy of 
the independent ECB as key to supporting the euro, which in turn has lent stability to the 
macroeconomic situation and ability to coordinate national crisis responses.  However, while 
emphasizing that all the economic policy levers available needed to be utilized to handle a 
problem of this magnitude, the Commission acknowledged that the most effective policy 
levers (especially those to stimulate short-term consumer demand) are those utilized at the 
member state level.  But since all member states were operating under fiscal constraints this 
required committed coordination.  The role of the EU, in the Commission’s view, would 
mainly be to catalyze “smart action” (European Commission 2008, 5).
 The strategic aims of the plan, to stimulate demand and confidence and to lessen the 
impact of the downturn on the most vulnerable primarily through the mitigation of job loss 
and avoidance of long-term unemployment, were in line with the goals of the Lisbon 
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Strategy for Jobs and Growth, and would help position Europe to take a leading role when 
economic prosperity returned.  This would be achieved by structural reforms and investments 
in the development of the knowledge economy.  Investments towards a low-carbon economy 
would have positive economic effects by encouraging technological innovation, increasing 
“green-collar” employment, reducing energy cost, and decreasing dependence on foreign 
energy.
 Put succinctly, the plan consisted of immediate budgetary expansion amounting to 
1.5% of EU GDP, consisting of €30 billion spent by the EU and €170 billion by the member 
states, as well as a variety of reforms for the future (European Commission 2008, 6).  The 
European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development were 
also to increase their budgets over the coming years.  There is reference to the need for easy 
monetary policy consisting of liberal lending by the ECB to stabilize markets and contribute 
to liquidity.  
 In laying out qualifications for the budgetary stimulus, the Commission said that it 
must be “timely, temporary, targeted, and coordinated;” comprised of a mix of both spending 
and revenue measures; within the guidelines of the SGP; include structural reforms to 
promote resilience; improve market function; improve competitiveness problems; support 
employment and workers who are transitioning in and out of the labor market; and reduce 
regulatory and administrative burdens on business (European Commission 2008, 8-10).  The 
fiscal stimulus of the Recovery Plan was to be closely connected to the four priority areas of 
the Lisbon Strategy, i.e. people, business, infrastructure and energy, research and innovation.  
It was also suggested to invest heavily in the maintenance of the active labor force through 
skills upgrading and career counseling.  Member states should use the leverage they have on 
financial institutions by encouraging them to provide credit to consumers and businesses.  
Investments in infrastructure were encouraged to soften the blow to the disproportionately 
weakened construction sector, as well as to poise member states for future success.  
 The plan also encouraged member states to maintain their trade links and export edge 
through engagement at the WTO, development of free trade agreements, supporting Eastern 
European markets, and building a close relationship with the new US administration. 
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 The European Union stimulus plan was administered in varying degrees by member 
states.  Consequently, the poorest Southern European states and/or those that had been most 
devastated by the crisis were often those which were unable to implement the vigorous 
stimulative spending programs that were needed.  Indeed, spending over $100 billion, or 
about 3% of GDP, Germany was a leading domestic spender on stimulus, but of course is one 
of the wealthiest and largest member states (OECD 2009, 20).  Portugal, on the other hand, 
spent approximately 0.4% of GDP on fiscal stimulus between 2008 and 2010 (OECD 2009, 
20).
 In addition to discretionary fiscal stimulus, the EU was equipped with automatic 
fiscal stabilizers, such as stringent employment protection programs to absorb economic 
shock and keep consumers spending (Kulish 2009, A1).  Stabilizers are beneficial in that they 
are not politically constrained, do not suffer from implementation lags, and do not run the 
risk of remaining in place after a crisis has been resolved (Baunsgaard 2009, 5).  Of course, 
since automatic stabilizers are a matter of fiscal policy, they are handled at the member state 
level, and there is variety to their implementation.  Such policies do exist in the United States 
to a limited extent (unemployment insurance being one example), although are generally 
used much more narrowly, being considered both costly and incompatible with a free-market 
ethos.
 At a certain point, as the economic crisis slid into a sovereign debt crisis, austerity 
measures became the more widely used policy response in Europe.  
 United States. In the United States, stimulus through deficit spending came in the 
form of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, signed into law shortly after 
the inauguration of President Barack Obama.  To date, the act has injected $840 billion into 
the US economy by means of tax benefits; contracts, grants, and loans; and entitlements 
(Congressional Budget Office 2012, 1). The statement of purpose for ARRA included the 
following objectives:
1. “To preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery.
2. To assist those most impacted by the recession.
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3. To provide investments needed to increase economic efficiency by 
spurring technological advances in science and health.
4. To invest in transportation, environmental protection, and other 
infrastructure that will provide long-term economic benefits. 
5. To stabilize State and local government budgets, in order to 
minimize and avoid reductions in essential services and 
counterproductive state and local tax increases (American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).”
 ARRA was funded directly from US Treasury holdings, meaning it added 
dramatically to the US federal deficit.  Approximately $290.7 billion have been spent on tax 
benefits; $250.4 billion on contracts, grants, and loans; and $244.2 billion on entitlements.  
Expenditures began upon enactment of the Act in February 2009, and will essentially run 
through 2019 (Congressional Budget Office 2012, 1).  The ARRA was fully administered and 
funded at the federal level, and widely served as a stopgap for state and local funding 
shortages.  States and municipalities do not have the ability to leverage debt to the same 
extent as the federal government, so the federal financial assistance was crucial to many 
states (many of which were, and some of which continue to be, in dire fiscal straits - some to 
the point of bankruptcy).  
 The stimulus act in the United States proved to be highly politically contentious, with 
arguments in both directions arguing that it was either too expensive for the nation to afford 
or too small to be as effective as it needed to be.  Political developments, largely spurred by 
backlash to the ARRA, would have dramatic implications for the possibility for further 
stimulus spending in the future.  This will be discussed later in this paper. 
 Monetary Stimulus
 Monetary policy was also employed for its stimulus effects in both the United States 
and European Union.  In both areas, interest rates were effectively lowered to zero in the 
wake of the financial crisis, where they have remained since.  Both banks also utilized a 
variety of mechanisms for increasing liquidity in the economy.  In the United States, the 
controversial policy of quantitative easing involved the Federal Reserve buying large 
amounts of mortgage backed securities and other assets to take toxic assets off private bank 
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balance sheets and inject liquidity into the economy.  The ECB also bought assets, though in 
the form of sovereign bonds, and made liquidity available to banks.  These policies will be 
detailed below.
 With the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, Ben Bernanke (who had 
become chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in early 2006) began to 
dramatically slash the federal funds rate to accommodate the liquidity crisis which was 
wracking the financial sector.  Over the following months and years, the Fed continued to 
engage in expansionary monetary policy, lending to banks at near-zero interest rates, as well 
as exploring unconventional monetary actions such as large-scale asset purchases.  The 
overall effect of Fed monetary policy has been to inject roughly $4 trillion into the economy 
since the outset of the crisis (Zumbrun and Saralva 2012).
 The Fed used three varieties of monetary tools in addition to Federal funds interest 
rate cuts to support the economy through the early months and years of the crisis, some of 
which are still in use five years on.  The first group of tools were for lending to traditional 
banks and other financial institutions.  This was perhaps the most immediately effective 
action it took as the crisis unfolded, as without substantial liquid support, major financial 
institutions would have been insolvent early in the crisis.  The second group of tools was also 
for lending but directly to borrowers and investors.  The final group of monetary policy tools 
were beyond the traditional scope of the Fed’s activities and as such were the most 
controversial.  These were the asset purchases, as referenced before, of Treasury securities 
and mortgage-backed securities.  This practice continued in the years following the crisis, 
and as recently as September 2012 the Fed announced its intention to purchase mortgage-
backed securities at the rate of $40 billion per month through mid-2015 (Federal Reserve 
Board 2012).  
  In the European Union, monetary policy executed by the ECB has been somewhat 
similar to that of the Federal Reserve, in that conventional interest rate cuts were put in place 
at the outset of the crisis, and a variety of non-standard measures followed.  Additionally, 
clear communication of policy actions and their rationale were key for managing private 
sector expectations, with the hope of promoting stability (ECB 2011, 90).  Similarly to the 
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Federal Reserve, the ECB lowered its interest rates to 1% between October 2008 and May 
2009.  Additional nonstandard measures adopted were intended to facilitate credit flows and 
financing conditions despite the liquidity crisis and beyond what would be possible with 
interest adjustments only.  These measures are referred to as Enhanced Credit Support (ECB 
2011, 124).  It was not until substantially later, in May 2010, that the ECB introduced its 
Securities Markets Programme, in which the ECB announced it would buy unlimited 
amounts of sovereign bonds contingent upon fiscal conditions (ECB 2011, 128).  In a sense, 
SMP was similar to the Federal Reserve practice of purchasing large quantities of MBS, 
although that was a strategy to ensure financial sector liquidity and stability, while SMP was 
in response to the sovereign debt crisis, intended to keep member states solvent and prevent 
the risk of contagion.  
B. Legislative Reform
 Financial regulation was clearly a necessary step in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis as well, although it was enacted substantially later than stimulus actions were 
undertaken.  In the United States, regulation came in the form of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  Signed by President Obama on July 21, 2010, the law 
contained a broad array of reforms aimed at curbing abusive lending practices and 
strengthening oversight of financial institutions in the hope of averting future crises on the 
magnitude of the most recent one.  Among the major reforms and initiatives contained in the 
act were those to restore the Glass-Steagall era restriction on proprietary trading by banking 
entities, establish minimum capital requirements for financial companies, establish the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, and more comprehensively regulate derivatives 
(DavisPolk 2010, iii-vi).  The effects of this act will be felt in just about every corner of the 
US financial industry and the US regulatory system, ranging from the SEC to the newly 
created CFPB.
 Financial reform in the European Union arrived slightly later.  Although the 
framework for suggested reform was outlined by the European Commission in the De 
Larosiere report in 2009, legislation was ultimately passed by the European Council on 
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November 10, 2010.  In contrast to the Dodd-Frank act, which in itself provided a 
comprehensive catalogue of detailed reforms to be enacted, legislation in the EU served 
primarily to establish an array of new supervisory bodies, for both macro-prudential and 
micro-prudential supervision.  They were the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), 
European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA), and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (Council of the 
European Union 2010, 1).  
 
Policy Outputs
Fiscal Stimulus Monetary Stimulus Legislative reform
United States American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act
Cut interest rates, 
quantitative easing 
through purchase of 
Treasury securities 
and mortgage-backed 
securities
Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection 
Act
European Union Automatic stabilizers, 
European Economic 
Recovery Plan
Cut interest rates, 
Enhanced Credit 
Support, Securities 
Markets Programme
ESRB, EBA, EIOPA, 
ESMA established
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III.  Explanations
 Substantial research has been done to analyze points of divergence for policy outputs 
in the United States and European Union.  Pisani-Ferry and Posen, for example, suggest that 
divergence has been a product of the limited scope of the ECB and lack of a fiscal authority 
in the EU.  More broadly, though, they stress that policymakers in the US believed that 
permanent output capacity was not diminished by the crisis, and that further governmental 
activism would be necessary and capable of nourishing the steady recovery to achieve full 
pre-crisis output (as well as the fact that low employment is generally less politically 
palatable in the US than in the EU) (Pisani-Ferry 2012, 36-37).  Shelkle, on the other hand, 
suggests that in some instances traditional characteristics of “good governance” were 
discarded in the US response to the crisis, but were employed on the EU side, and vice versa 
in others.  For example, she argues that central bank independence was compromised on the 
part of the US but enforced vigorously in the EU, while fiscal rules on state budgets were 
followed closely in the US but relaxed in the EU (Shelkle 2010, 35).
 For my analysis of such divergent policy responses on each side of the Atlantic I will 
focus on the three major factors, institutional and political, which influenced the possibility 
of such responses.  They are: the respective mandates and perceived legitimacy of the Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank, contemporary political trends in the United States 
and European Union, and the differing implications of federalism and multilevel governance 
in the United States and European Union.   
A. Central Banks
 Constitutional Mandates
 The central banks of the United States and the European Union, the Federal Reserve 
and the European Central Bank, respectively, serve similar functions although they are 
subject to substantially different power dynamics and operate under differing mandates.  The 
 
Federal Reserve in the United States has a dual mandate to maintain price stability and 
maximize employment.  The European Central Bank, on the other hand, is only mandated to 
maintain price stability, as defined by the Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on European Union.  
TEU assigns price stability as the primary objective of the ECB.  This reflects a “broad 
consensus” that price stability is the best contribution that the bank can make toward 
economic growth and social cohesion (Executive Board of the ECB 2011, 7).  Thus, as 
referenced before, the ECB has fulfilled its mandate in recent years, although such singular 
focus on price stability does tend to constrain countercyclical policy options in times of 
crisis, potentially even causing pro-cyclical effects.  On the other hand, the Fed has engaged 
in an easy-money policy with what would traditionally be considered inflationary measures 
intended to bolster growth instead of simply stabilizing prices.  Although the crux of my 
argument indeed lies in the result of the differing mandates of the Federal Reserve and the 
ECB, we should keep in mind that central banks do increase or stray from the confines of 
their mandate in time of crisis (and both of these banks did just that during 2008 and 2009) 
(Pisani-Ferry 2010, 20). 
 Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the ECB has valued price stability above 
all things, despite the fluctuations of the global political economy.  The Fed, it seems, is more 
willing to go beyond the scope of its mandate to react to the political and economic context.  
Indeed, the scope of its activities is a living dynamic, as some of the measures seen today as 
extraordinary, such as asset purchases and direct lending, were common practice in the early 
twentieth century.  Perhaps the ECB has been less willing to expand its scope as it worked to 
establish its identity over the first decade of the common currency, although the crisis 
certainly forced it to adapt to new realities.  If financial systems have historically been 
vehicles for economic and national growth, which has also been the primary motivation for 
economic integration and strength of the EU, regulation may, on the face of it, seem counter 
to the purpose of the EU, which would explain the ECB’s reluctance to engage directly in 
regulation, leading instead to the establishment of new oversight bodies.  In fact, a system 
designed around the purpose of economic liberalization inherently limits the capacity for 
public intervention (Jachtenfuchs 2004, 110).  It should also be noted that the institutional 
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mechanisms for banking unity and regulation have been in place for significantly longer 
periods in the United States than in the EU.  The National Banking Act took regulation out of 
state hands 1865, giving competence to the federal level, and the Federal Reserve was 
established in 1913 (Snider 2011, 124).  Compare this to the 2011 establishment of the 
European Banking Authority and 1998 establishment of the European Central Bank, and the 
ongoing debate over central bank activity and regulation becomes understandable. 
 Relation to public opinion
 We should also think of the banks’ mandates as they relate to their relative distance 
from the voting population and perceptions of their political independence.  The strident 
political independence of the ECB, due to its exclusive focus on price stability, certainly 
contributes to its constrained policy portfolio.  It seems intent on staying true to its narrowly 
defined mission and unwilling to expand very much beyond its relatively constrained 
mandate, even in the context of systemic crisis.  A slew of empirical research has shown that 
central bank political independence is key to maintaining low inflation (Mishkin 2011, 8).  
On one hand, it has been shown that monetary policy is time-inconsistent, in that ad-hoc 
policy changes made in frequent response to short-term economic changes can tend to result 
in worse overall economic performance than if a commitment was made to a long-term 
strategy (Mishkin 2011, 8).  Without central bank independence, it would be likely that 
central bankers could fall under the sway of popular opinion, pursuing low inflation at the 
expense of employment or vice versa.  
 However, in democracies, central banks must be accountable to the people because 
they are public institutions.  It is necessary for banks and legislatures to have a collaborative 
and constructive dialogue in which the bank is aware of the objectives of the elected officials 
but free to pursue its own agenda due to its unique position to judge the efficacy of a given 
policy.  The regularly scheduled testimony given to Congress by the Fed chairman, Ben 
Bernanke, is an example.  
 In this vein, the decision of the ECB to reject quantitative easing was a political one.  
Provision of liquidity to banks was acceptable, because it was within spirit of the Maastricht 
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treaty, but the wholesale purchase of government bonds (i.e. quantitative easing) was not, 
because it could be considered to violate the separation of monetary and budgetary policy 
(Pisani-Ferry 2012, 26).  The European Council has EU budgetary authority, and the ECB is 
diligent and demonstrative about its determination to stay independent.  Encouragement by 
the European Council for the ECB to exceed its mandate could be seen to compromise the 
political independence of the bank (Pisani-Ferry 2012, 27).  Furthermore, exceedingly loose 
monetary policy would have been highly politically unpopular with the Germans, for 
example, who were reluctant to introduce a common currency in the first place.
 If the central banks are to take losses as a result of nonconventional asset purchases 
such as monetary easing, they may come under congressional or parliamentary scrutiny, 
which could compromise their political independence and lead to the problems described 
earlier.  Additionally, the purchase of private securities can be considered within the realm of 
fiscal policy, i.e. legislative territory, also compromising its independence (Mishkin 2011, 
29).  
 The ECB responds to the European Council, a supranational governing body, while 
the Fed responds to the US Congress, a directly elected body.  The Fed’s closer and less 
problematic connection to the voting populace, despite its political independence, enabled it 
take a more interventionist approach than the ECB, which is another level removed from the 
people.  This probably also influenced the approach that the respective banks took toward 
regulation.  Due to the Fed’s relatively greater institutional proximity to the citizenry, a 
detail-oriented legislative regulatory overhaul was appropriate, while the ECB’s distance lent 
merit to the creation of new oversight bodies instead.   
 Dominant Policy Paradigms
 As for the technical details of the Fed’s monetary policy, these also reflect 
contemporary trends, if not in political views, per se, but in the evolution of consensus on the 
most effective economic action that a central bank can take, as well as what the appropriate 
role of a central bank is in the first place.  Opinions on the best course of action for a central 
bank evolve as well.  Although this reflects the evolving understanding of the science of 
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monetary policy, the ideological position of monetary policy shifts as well, and this is often 
revealed in the political debate.  Monetary policy as a remedy for recession was not a large 
part of macroeconomic theory in the 1950s and 1960s, as the Keynesian focus on demand as 
a driver of economic fluctuation was more in vogue.  However, the literature that Milton 
Friedman produced in the 1960s was extremely influential in the development of economic 
consensus, as central bankers came to believe that inflation was always a product of 
monetary policy, and as such their central task would be to control inflation (Mishkin 2011, 
4).  Robert Lucas published a series of influential papers in the 1970s describing rational 
expectation theory, positing that the public and markets will act in response to what they 
view to be the most likely future policy action. That is, economic activity will be driven not 
only by present policy, but expectations about future policy.  As such, “the management of 
expectations about future policy” are now central to the formation of monetary policy 
(Mishkin 2011, 6). 
  Optimal monetary policy theory before the crisis was based on the new neoclassical 
synthesis, which stressed the importance of monetary policy for inflation, the importance of 
price stability, the compatibility of employment and price stability, and the need for monetary  
policy that is not concerned with short-term objectives, as well as the importance of an 
independent and credible central bank (Mishkin 2011, 3-12).  This monetary policy is 
referred to as “flexible inflation targeting” (Mishkin 2011, 14).  Before the crisis, the Fed and 
ECB behaved as did most all central banks with independent monetary policy power, by 
setting a credible long-term inflation target while taking short-term steps to enhance output.  
One difference, though, is the ECB’s willingness to set a concrete target, but unwillingness to 
refer to it as such - perhaps due to the aversion to missing that target.  The Fed, on the other 
hand, was unwilling to even announce an official inflation target, rather suggesting that 
“appropriate monetary policy” would be carried out (Mishkin 2011, 14).  Spring 2010 
marked a major point of departure as the ECB generally saw it unnecessary to continue 
exceptional support, while the Fed continued to employ activist monetary policy.  
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B. Contemporary Political Trends
 In the United States the political winds during the tempest years of the crisis were 
decidedly under the sails of Keynesian politicians with the election of Barack Obama and the 
Democratic congress (even the administration of George W. Bush before, while not explicitly 
Keynesian, certainly engaged in stimulative fiscal and monetary policy), resulting in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and continual stimulative efforts by the 
Fed.  However, in the two years after his election, a large contingent of the American 
populace organized in opposition to what they viewed as federal overreach, with substantial 
electoral consequences for the 2010 midterm elections.  In the EU, on the other hand, as the 
financial crisis evolved into a sovereign debt crisis, political favor in wealthier countries such 
as Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands turned against collaborative efforts to bolster 
national finances of other member states such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain.  Net donor 
countries generally favored austerity for net recipient countries, under the guise that it would 
help alleviate the economic downturn.  Unfortunately, such prescriptions did not appear to 
work, and revealed what may be charged as protectionist impulses in the donor states.  Voters 
in recipient states, on the other hand, clearly let their displeasure be known.  Far-right parties 
gained support in Greece, for example, and Mario Monti was faced with broad unpopularity 
in Italy, viewed as an illegitimate technocrat.  This chronic tension between those prescribing 
austerity and those chafing under its constraints slowed the political process.  The lack of 
European solidarity was exacerbated by the lingering effects and debates of the crisis.  
 United States
 The onset of the crisis coincided with the general election campaign for president, in 
which Barack Obama won a resounding victory, apparently winning broad public support for 
Democratic programming.  Upon taking office, Obama was greeted by a political balance 
which was amenable to his policy preferences.  Propelled by a decisive electoral victory, and 
enabled by Democratic control of both chambers of Congress, the Obama administration was 
able to work relatively swiftly to implement its agenda in response to the crisis.  Moreover, 
the US federal government did not believe that the crisis indicated a permanent reduction in 
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economic output capacity, lending more faith to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies by 
Congress and the Fed (Pisani-Ferry 2012, 14).
 The Dodd-Frank act was the most ambitious overhaul of the financial regulatory 
regime in the United States since the wake of the Great Depression, and followed several 
decades of particularly fervent deregulation, epitomized perhaps most famously by the repeal 
of the Glass-Steagall Act in the late 1990s.  The possibility for such an ambitious reform bill 
to be implemented was a clear indication of a changed political environment after the 
previous decades of deregulation (Snider 2011, 125).
 However, another major political shift would reroute the legislative course of the 
recovery.  The congressional midterm elections of 2010 had a further destabilizing effect as 
Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives, largely due to public disapproval of 
the state of the economy and the handling of the crisis by the legislative and executive 
branches, and fueled by the rise of the fervently small-government Tea Party.  This fringe 
group quickly gained a somewhat mainstream status, expressing distaste for what they 
viewed as expensive and intrusive federal legislative achievements, including bailouts of the 
financial and auto industries, the recovery act, healthcare reform, and the Dodd-Frank 
financial regulatory reform.  Following these elections, after which the House was 
Republican-led and Senate Democrats no longer held a supermajority, one would expect a 
less activist US government in the crisis. Indeed, it was extremely difficult for the 
administration to address lingering issues from the crisis.  The midterm elections derailed the 
ambition for a second stimulus package, and no no major legislative actions stimulating or 
regulating the economy were passed. Hence the responsibility to tackle the crisis was left 
primarily to the Fed by means of subsequent rounds of monetary easing. 
 Following the 2012 presidential election, Obama has shown signs of assertiveness 
and combativeness, although he is still faced with a divided Congress.  However, economic 
growth has generally been positive, and absent some major shock, it is unlikely that further 
legislative action will be necessary for the crisis.  
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  European Union
 The Commission is a non-political technocratic body, the Council can be thought of 
as an all-party government, and the European Parliament requires broad consensus due to 
qualified majority voting.  All of these factors, in the opinion of Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-
Koch, are institutional arrangements that blunt the effect of party politics (105).  The 
Commission is bound to take a “scientific” approach to solving problems, i.e. leave 
normative arguments to national politics (Jachtenfuchs, 105).  However, despite the 
technocratic nature of the European institutions, national politics are still highly influential as 
there has been little consensus among various member states, particularly along the north-
south axis, about what the best policy is moving forward.  It is inevitable that normative, 
nationally-biased political opinions influence the formation of system-wide policy.  In the 
case of the economic crisis, these policy positions can be seen as a result of both ideological 
alignment and territorial alignment, which will now be examined in turn.
 As in the United States, the economic crisis has had dramatic implications for 
domestic member state politics and national governance in Europe.  And, similar to the 
United States, enthusiasm for stimulus faded as the crisis wore on.  The text of the recovery 
plan proposal, which explicitly labels its policy steps as “a counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
response” (European Commission 2008, 6), reflected the prevailing willingness for bold 
governmental action in the early phase of the crisis.  In subsequent years, language reflecting 
support for state intervention would have been more controversial.  Indeed, austerity became 
the policy mode of choice promoted principally by the Germans, along with other wealthy 
member states such as the Netherlands and Denmark.  For much of the sovereign debt crisis, 
there was a clear ideological divergence between those states advocating fiscal stimulus and 
those advocating austerity.  However, the presidential election in France was a significant 
turning point for the strength of ideological solidarity, for example, as it was largely a 
rejection of fiscal coordination with center-right Nicolas Sarkozy being ousted by the 
Socialist Francois Hollande (Dinan 2012, 85).  Hollande’s campaign explicitly rejected the 
politics of austerity (Donahue 2012).  Likewise, elections in Greece affirmatively rejected 
EU-imposed technocratic austerity (Dinan 2012, 85).  Much of the response to the eurozone 
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crisis has been intergovernmental in nature, emphasizing the prerogative of states and the 
lengths to which they will attempt to protect their interests. 
 In addition to evolving consensus based on ideological alignments, there has clearly 
been consensus based around territorial position (which frequently paralleled economic 
strength).  Decision-making at the European level is bound to a great degree by territorial 
interests.  The Council of Ministers and European Council are comprised of heads of state 
and national ministers.  Accordingly, much of the action undertaken at the European level 
resembles the politics of current member state governments, and is not necessarily a 
reflection of broader political coalitions or interest groups.  Furthermore, the formal veto 
power of these representatives often precludes change away from arrangements which favor 
current dominant interests.  This vertical axis favors the states, so it should be no surprise 
when the larger, wealthier, and more powerful states are able to have outsized influence on 
the policy of the EU (Moravcsik 2001, 175). The practical implications of this dynamic have 
been seen in the policy responses to the crisis.  That is to say, beyond an ideological 
divergence, richer countries of the North were generally less willing to financially support 
the struggling countries of the South, such as Spain and Greece.  There is a major disconnect 
between core Europe and peripheral Europe, both geographically and financially.  The 
wealthier countries of Europe, with competitive economies which have effectively been 
subsidizing the Mediterranean countries’ emergence from the crisis, fear further loss of 
wealth not only if the debtor countries are unable to pay them back, but also from the 
potential losses entailed in a proposed banking union.  Furthermore, there is a fundamental 
lack of trust on the part of the northern countries regarding the institutional functioning of 
southern countries like Italy and Greece, where corruption, electoral turnover, and general 
financial mismanagement have plagued those societies for years.  
 C. Governance Structures
 Federal Theory
 Considering the federal nature of both the United States and the European Union is a 
good starting point as an understanding of how the dispersion of power throughout the two 
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unions affects political processes in each.  Federal democracy relies on constituents to 
distribute power as they see fit.  Being that the EU has been constituted in a confederal 
fashion, with sovereign states ceding limited amounts of authority to the supranational level, 
it is understandable that tension comes from below.  The power in the United States has been 
concentrated more centrally at the federal level.
 The historical development of the EU and US had major implications for how the 
polity saw themselves in relation to the union, and how the individual states were situated in 
the federal context.  The federal United States developed to reconcile the two goals of self-
government and political integration over a vast area.  This federal structure was intended to 
achieve a government that would dynamically respond to the will of the governed, would 
facilitate interaction between the governed and the government, balance liberty and order, 
and secure moral and civil order.  As Elazar points out, the American federal structure was 
designed to be a comprehensive government (2001, 39).  Clearly, the EU was conceived in a 
significantly different fashion, in that a collection of comprehensive governments were 
already in existence, and these governments agreed to transfer a limited portion of their 
power to the supranational level.  In this way, politics were largely left as an internal 
domestic affair, and the development of a federal political culture was impeded.  
Furthermore, popular trust of the European Union is currently substantially lower now (33% 
in Autumn 2012) than just before the onset of the crisis (57% in Spring 2007).  The 
percentage of citizens reporting positive feelings toward the EU have declined and those 
feeling negatively have increased in that time as well, converging at about 30% each 
(Directorate General for Communication 2012, 14-15).
 Many theorists of European integration appeared to view the integration process itself 
as the goal to pursue, rather than a tool for achieving some practical ends.  In the event of the 
economic crisis, it was revealed how  “European integration has tended to be seen as a 
valued end in itself, often confusing means with ends. It is only once the process started to 
produce results, that the question of the form of government and indeed the nature of the 
political enterprise was raised. In the United States, on the other hand, the federal form of 
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government was conceived to embody the fundamental republican and democratic principles 
which inhered in American civil society” (Elazar 2001, 32). 
 It is perhaps ironic that the economic crisis has proven to be by far the biggest threat 
to European unity of the past fifty years considering that the primary goal of the project was 
to consolidate economic progress.  Europe is founded on economic liberalism but limited 
partnership, an apparent contradiction in the event of systemic economic crisis (Elazar 2001, 
40). 
 The spillover effect, described by functionalists as the process by which the 
competences of the EU expand, has been incremental and the crisis hit before the process 
was truly complete, with the capabilities in place to be able to respond appropriately.  
“Appropriate and substantial if not complete powers for each function were given first to a 
specific functional authority and then to the EC, which was the multipurpose expression of 
those functional authorities. Only after the number of functions increased to the point that 
more general institutions were required were such institutions constituted, in different ways 
for each class of powers” (Elazar 2001, 37).  A comprehensive constitution was made 
through a formal convention in the United States, while the European process has been 
piecemeal through several successive treaties. 
 The differing federal structures of the EU and US also have implications with respect 
to the authority to engage in fiscal stimulus.  The US budget is crafted at federal level and is 
relatively quite large.  In the EU, only national level budgets have macroeconomic impact, as 
EU-level budget is relatively insignificant.  “The traditional Musgravian allocation of 
responsibilities, which assigns stabilization to the central level, therefore does not apply to 
Europe, where the EU budget plays no macroeconomic role whatsoever” (Pisani-Ferry 2010, 
30).  The relatively insignificant budget of the EU makes it unable to effectively leverage 
stimulative spending at the European level (or carry out many other programs normally 
executed by other federal governments, for that matter), leaving it as a primarily regulatory 
body.  It is for this reason that fiscal stimulus was mostly forced to be undertaken by the 
member states’ own governments, and why it relied on regulatory action for other remedies, 
i.e. monetary policy and reform of financial oversight (Moravcsik 2001, 170). 
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 US budgetary policy allows for more discretion, allowing it to work counter-
cyclically, while EU budgetary policy relies more on automatic stabilizers, and since the 
macroeconomic-effective budgets are at the state level, they are constrained by the SGP and 
less able to respond in times of crisis (Pisani-Ferry 2010, 30). 
 There is a moral commitment which is a significant aspect of the federal union 
project.  That is, it has generally been agreed that decisions will be made for the common 
good, and that no individual state would take an action harmful to the rest.  This union was 
meant to transcend ethnicity, as well as cultural and territorial differences.  It might be 
jarring, then, for some observers to witness the political repercussions of the crisis, and the 
division which has come as a result of it. The decentralized power distribution of the EU puts 
member states into an uneasy partnership at times of crisis.  On one hand, crisis reveals the 
true extent to which the various member states have not integrated into one larger European 
identity and to which the member states prioritize their own national interests.  On the other 
hand, there is a clear reluctance to completely shun cooperation as member states recognize 
the degree to which they are economically integrated; not only will the failure of a member 
state have substantial repercussions for its peers, but others are aware that they could very 
well require such assistance in the future and would not be served to burn bridges in the 
present.  Furthermore, of course, is the fact that a union-wide solution may be vastly more 
efficient than a collection of member-state level solutions.  This may be a normative aspect of 
the federal ideal: the spirit of collective action and support.  Where such an ideal becomes 
complicated in practice, as evidenced by the comparative cases of the United States and 
European Union, is in the level of power concentration.  Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch refer 
to the way in which the transgovernmentalism of the EU institutionalizes autonomy, thus 
complicating cooperation (102).
 Multilevel Governance
 The concept of multilevel governance may be key to a comprehensive understanding 
of the course of policy responses in the United States and European Union to the different 
phases of the crisis as well.  Explained most simply, the concept of multilevel governance 
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analyzes how power is concentrated at various levels of government and how it can facilitate 
or prevent decision-making at a given level.  In the United States the most relevant interplay 
is between state and federal legislatures, while, similarly yet differently, the dynamic is 
between national and European level governing bodies in the European Union.  
 Multilevel governance is a relatively new concept in the field of political science, 
being first developed by Hooghe and Marks in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, 
and used to analyze how authority was shifted among the subnational, national, and 
supranational levels.  In the intervening years this concept has been widely debated and 
analyzed.  Hooghe and Marks claim that power has been shifted to supranational institutions 
and to the regional and local governments.  In this way, policy can be tailored to the relevant 
scale, increasing efficiency (2010, 17).  I would say that this certainly characterizes the ideals 
of the institutional architecture of the EU, including EMU, although the project of EMU had 
not been thoroughly developed in time to effectively sustain the Eurosystem and European 
System of Central Banks more broadly through such a major crisis.  The EU is characteristic 
of what Hooghe and Marks have labeled Type I governance, for which the intellectual 
foundation is federalism.  This contains a limited number of jurisdictional levels, which are 
each general purpose (2010, 18). 
 This is clearly relevant to the legislative decisions made regarding the crisis in the 
European Union, as well as the tensions which accompanied those decisions and which have 
delayed others.  Approaching financial regulatory reform is difficult, regardless of whether it 
is being enacted by a national legislative body, as in the US, or by a supranational body, as in 
the EU.  This is because financial regulation is not only a technical but a normative subject.  
Seeking consensus among such a broad array of opinions and interests is exceedingly 
difficult. 
 Many eurosceptics or critics are suspicious of an overly powerful or extensive 
European superstate (although similar criticism and paranoia abound in the US as well), 
which delayed the development of appropriate crisis resolution tools before the recent 
economic upheavals, and certainly have not facilitated progress recently either.  The 
perception of distance and illegitimacy of technocracy abounds in Europe, particularly in the 
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Southern states that have come under the stewardship of wealthier northern states in recent 
years.
 Levels of governance also have implications for the perceived legitimacy of the 
central banks and their perceived responsiveness to the needs and desires of the polity.  The 
Fed is subject to the oversight of the US Congress, which is a body of directly elected 
representatives who were (in the case of the House, which constitutes the vast majority of 
Congress) elected in proportion to the represented constituency.  The ECB, on the other hand 
is subject to Commission oversight, the Commission being a body of political appointees 
who are in turn answerable to the European Parliament, which is itself a proportionally 
elected body.  
 The increasing specialization of policy areas such as international finance has 
necessitated the development of a highly trained technocratic elite operating at the 
supranational level and more or less insulated from the pressures of national politics.  This 
sort of autonomy may have the effect of leaving few, if any, of the interest groups affected by  
their policy outputs satisfied, as has been the case throughout the course of the crisis.  
Additionally the internal deliberations and processes of the Council and its committees 
enable legislators to evade close public scrutiny.  All of these things add to the democratic 
deficit and spur feelings of euroscepticism among many of the populace.      
 With regards to the most democratic of the EU institutions, the European Parliament, 
there is often a knowledge deficit among the voting populace as to the functioning of the EP 
and how their MEPs can effect change or how they fit into the policy-making process 
(Jachtenfuchs 2004, 111).  This can create an unfortunate feedback in which national party 
members are punished electorally for action taken at the European level, simply because their 
fellow party members were associated with an unpopular European legislative action, and not 
necessarily for a substantive reason.  This has contributed to the political flux in the EU and 
the delay in reaching a satisfying resolution to the crisis.  
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IV. Conclusion
 The elements identified in the preceding sections collectively explain why the 
response in the EU to the financial crisis of the past five years has been considerably less 
impactful and more piecemeal, not to mention politically fraught, than that of the United 
States.  In particular they have been used to explain economic stimulus (monetary policy 
employed by their respective central banks, as well as direct stimulative spending) and the 
process towards reform of financial regulation in each area.
 We first examined the respective central banks of the United States and European 
Union.  While serving essentially similar functions, these banks operate in remarkably 
distinct political and structural environments and are driven by different mandates.  The 
Federal Reserve is a politically independent institution, guided by a dual mandate to maintain 
inflation at a healthy level and to minimize unemployment.  However, the action of the Fed 
does implicitly respond to political winds, and may deviate from its mandate in times of 
crisis.  The European Central Bank, on the other hand, typically stays quite close to its strict 
and limited mandate, keeping a small portfolio of policy options and stridently avoiding 
entering the fiscal fray, which is beyond its mandate and could expose it to charges of 
illegitimacy or political partiality.  Its position is particularly complicated due to the ten EU 
member states which do not operate on the euro currency.    
 Next we examined the contemporary political environment throughout the various 
stages of response to the economic crisis.  In the United States, a rush of enthusiasm for 
expansionist monetary and fiscal policies coincided with the most critical period of the crisis 
as Barack Obama was elected president of the United States and took office.  With a clear 
mandate for action, he was able to sign into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act shortly after his inauguration, and the Federal Reserve, technically independent of 
political influence (although certainly aware of prevailing opinion) was able to proceed with 
stimulative monetary policy through the sharp reduction of interest rates and repeated rounds 
 
of monetary easing.  Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection act was signed into law in the Summer of 2010, shortly before congressional 
midterm elections gave control of the House to Republicans and ended the unitary control of 
government by Democrats, effectively stalling further decision action towards crisis 
resolution.  In the European Union, ideological division was more relevant to policy outputs 
in response to the sovereign debt crisis.  Rigid ideological alignments among those member 
states advocating austerity and those advocating stimulus, a division which paralleled the 
alignment of wealthier northern states against recipient southern states until the election of 
French president Hollande in 2012, prevented the smooth resolution of the crisis.
 Finally was an analysis of the way that governance structures have affected the ability 
of policy-makers in the United States and European Union to respond to the crises.  In 
particular, emphasis was given to the concepts of federalism and multi-level governance.  In 
the United States, the strong federal system effectively prevents any one state or group of 
states from impeding legislative action at the national level, which had major implications for 
the ability of the federal government to pass stimulus and regulatory legislation, as well as 
for the speed with which it was able to do so.  On the other hand, the legislative action at the 
European level required much more laborious, halting progress toward action.  Political 
divisions, both ideologically and territorially driven, impeded progress as member states 
jealously guarded their own prerogatives and domestic recovery.  
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